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INTRODUCTION 
The Utah Bankers' Association, by and through its 
counsel, Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, the Utah League of Insured 
Savings Association, by and through its counsel, Prince, Yeates & 
Geldzahler, and the Utah League of Credit Unions, by and through 
its counsel Bruce L. Richards & Associates (collectively the 
-Trade Associations") submit the following brief as amicus curiae 
and urge the court to withdraw its opinion in this case dated 
May 3, 1990. The Trade Associations respectfully submit that the 
Court's decision is contrary to express statutory law and, if left 
to stand, will have immediate serious and far-reaching negative 
effects on second-mortgage lending in the State of Utah, 
A. The Court's Decision Is Contrary to the Express 
Provisions of the Statute. 
In its May 3, 1990 decision, the Court held that the Utah 
Deficiency Statute (U.C.A. § 57-1-32 £t seq.) governs an action to 
collect on a promissory note when the security for that promissory 
note has been extinguished by foreclosure of a prior lien. This 
conclusion is in direct conflict with the language of the statute 
itself, which provides: 
At any time within three months after any 
sale of property under a trust deed, as 
hereinabove provided, an action may be 
commenced to recover the balance due upon the 
obligation for which the trust deed was given 
as security, and in such action the complaint 
shall set forth the entire amount of the 
indebtedness which was secured by such trust 
deed, the amount for which such property was 
sold, and the fair market value thereof at the 
date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the 
court shall find the fair market value at the 
date of sale of the property sold. The court 
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may not render judgment for more than the 
amount by which the amount of the indebtedness 
with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, 
including trustee's and attorneys fees, exceeds 
the fair market value of the property as of the 
date of the sale. In any action brought under 
this section, the prevailing party shall be 
entitled to collect its costs and reasonable 
attorneys fees incurred in bringing an action 
under this section. 
Utah Code Annot. § 57-1-32 (Emphasis added). 
By its terms this statute applies only to actions to 
collect the debt which is secured by the specific trust deed which 
was foreclosed, not obligations secured by junior liens which were 
foreclosed out at a foreclosure sale. In the present case, the 
debt sued upon by City Consumer Services was not secured by the 
trust deed that was foreclosed; instead, it was secured by a 
junior lien which was extinguished by the prior foreclosure of the 
first lien. Because of the prior sale under the senior trust 
deed, there was never any "sale of property under [the City 
Consumer Services junior] trust deed" for the Utah Deficiency 
Statute to come into play. The City Consumer Services debt was an 
unsecured obligation at the time of suit and therefore was not 
within the scope of the Utah Deficiency Statute. 
B. Borrowers Are Adequately Protected Under Existing Case 
Law Interpreting the One-Action Rule. 
Any arguable inequity to borrowers from applying the 
lower court's decision is alleviated by the application to lenders 
of Utah's one-action rule codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1, 
which provides that 
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M[t]here can be one action for the recovery of 
any debt of the enforcement of any right 
secured solely by mortgage upon real estate 
which action must be in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter.m 
Lenders can avoid the consequences of the one-action rule 
only by satisfying the conditions for the narrow exception to the 
one-action rule that a lender may independently sue on a debt that 
was once secured by a lien on real property only if the security 
was lost through no fault of the lender. This exception was 
stated by the Court as follows: 
. . . where the security has been lost through 
no fault of the mortgagee/ an action may be 
maintained directly upon the personal 
obligation evidenced by the note without going 
through the idle and fruitless procedure of 
foreclosure. 
Cache Vallev Banking Co. v. Logan, 56 P.2d 1046, 1049 (Utah 
1936). See also Lockhart Co. v. Eguitable Realty Co., 657 P.2d 
1333 (Utah 1983); Utah Mortgage and Loan Co. v. Black, 618 P.2d 43 
(Utah 1980). 
Pursuant to this exception to the one-action rule, the 
Issue that was reined 3t "ttie «1rrial court level Xand also briefed 
before this Court) was whether City Consumer Services' decision 
not to bid at the foreclosure sale of the prior lien was a loss of 
its security through no fault of City Consumer Services. Judge 
Winder of the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah faced a similar issue in First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. 
Felqer, 658 F.Supp. 175 (D. Utah 1987). In Feloer, the bank 
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foreclosed on a first lien and then sued on a note which was owed 
to the same bank and which was originally secured by a second lien 
on the same property. In its motion for summary judgment, the 
bank stated that, at the time of foreclosure, the bank had an 
appraisal which showed that the value of the property being 
foreclosed did not exceed the amount owed on the first lien. 
Under these facts, the federal district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the bank, holding that, as a matter of law, 
the bank's action in allowing the second lien to be extinguished 
by not bidding at the sale of the first priority trust deed was 
not negligent or blameworthy. Jjl. at 182. 
The instant case presents the same one-action rule issue 
and should be decided consistent with the precedents for applying 
the narrow exception to the one-action rule. Addressing the scope 
of the exception to the one action rule satisfies the equitable 
concerns of this Court and offers the protection to the borrower 
that the one-action rule was designed to provide. Invoking Utah's 
Deficiency Statute when it was not at issue in this case sets a 
dangerous precedent which is not necessary in the context of this 
appeal. 
C. The Court's Decision Will Have a Serious and Negative 
Effect on the Second Mortgage Market. 
The Court's decision in this case will have serious 
repercussions for holders of second liens and will make borrowing 
against the equity in property more costly or perhaps 
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unavailable. Under the Court's decision, if allowed to stand, a 
second mortgage holder would be forced to advance monies to pay 
off senior liens in every situation, even if there was very little 
equity to protect. The current loans secured by subordinate trust 
deeds (which exceed $1,4 billion in Utah) are in serious jeopardy 
because of the Court's decision. If the banks, savings and loans 
and credit unions are required to pay off first liens in order to 
preserve their rights under these existing loans, the drain on the 
financial institutions could be devastating. Smaller financial 
institutions will be particularly harmed. A small credit union, 
for example, may be prohibited by either regulation or economics 
from risking its limited capital to purchase a first lien 
position. For example, assume that a small credit union is the 
holder of a five thousand dollar home equity line secured by a 
lien that is junior to a $250,000 first mortgage. Assume further 
that the first mortgage holder forecloses, is the successful 
bidder with a bid of $250,000, and later re-sells the property for 
$260,000. Under the Court's decision, the credit union would have 
had to advance $250,000 to the first lien holder to protect a 
$10,000 equity that arguably exists. The credit union, however, 
may not have the legal or practical ability to advance that sum of 
money. In addition, it would be unwise to advance the money to 
purchase the property at sale, hold the property for re-sale and 
incur the costs associated with re-sale of the property because 
the standard sales commission alone would exceed the supposed 
$10,000 equity. Under the logical extension of the Court's 
decision (which would result in the fair market limitation of 
Section 57-1-32 being applied to the credit union's recovery as 
well as the limitations period found in that same section), the 
credit union would be barred from collecting on its note if the 
fair market value were established to be $260,000, yet no 
reasonable lender could advance the money necessary to pay off the 
first lien. 
The Court's decision creates significant problems for 
existing junior lienholders, and these problems are magnified for 
the smaller institutions. As a result of the Court's decision, 
smaller institutions may very well decide to abandon the second 
mortgage market, thus decreasing competition in that market and 
increasing the cost of credit to borrowers. 
D. The Court Should Reconsider the Rationale of the Durbano 
Decision. 
In its decision in this case, the Court notes an 
^apparent" conflict with the Court of Appeals decision in G. Adams 
Limited Partnership v. Durbano. 782 P.2d 962 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989) 
(a copy of which is attached). The Trade Associations submit that 
the analysis of the Court of Appeals in the Durbano decision is 
precisely on point and merits great consideration by this Court. 
In the Durbano decision, the Court of Appeals succinctly identified 
one of the "anomalous results" of this Court's interpretation of 
the deficiency statute by raising the following example: 
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But what if that note was not in default? 
In appellants' view, the beneficiary would 
still have only three months to bring an action 
even though no action could be brought if no 
default existed. If the debtor could stay 
current for those three months, he or she could 
then cease making any payments whatsoever with 
absolute impunity. 
Id. at 964. 
The result in the example does nothing to advance the 
policies underlying both the deficiency statute and the one-action 
rule. These statutes were designed to offer some protection to 
borrowers, but not to prevent payment of legitimate debts. 
The Trade Associations urge the Court to consider the 
reasoning of the Durbano decision and the troublesome results that 
will be occasioned by the Court's decision in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trade Associations respectfully submit that the 
decision of the Court dated May 3, 1990 is contrary to the express 
provisions of the deficiency limitation statute, overlooks the 
protections already available under the one-action rule, and 
imposes unnecessary burdens on a second mortgage holder that will 
have serious and negative impact on borrowers and lenders. 
Respectfully submitted this day of May, 1990. 
RAY, QUHJNEY & NEBEKER 
Scott H. Clark 
James S. Jardine 
Douglas M. Monson 
Stephen C. Tingey 
Attorneys for the Utah Bankers' 
Association 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
^^y^^£^ 
William A. Meaders, Jr. 
Attorneys for the Utah League of 
Insured Savings Associations 
BRUCE L._RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES 
c^L^^^iruSL-
Bruce L. Richards 
Attorneys for the Utah League of 
Credit Unions 
SCT+362 
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Q And on or about June 27th of 1987, 
had you been convicted of a communica-
tions fraud felony? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. And August 1st, 1985, had you been 
convicted of a theft by deception felony? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. Had you ever communicated to Mr. 
Hansen anything about your criminal 
record? 
A. Yes he knew. 
Q. Did he know about that? 
A. Yes. 
Later, the prosecutor raised the issue of 
the prior convictions on cross-examination. 
Defense counsel did not object In his clos-
ing arguments, the prosecutor was not call-
ing the jury's attention to new matters, but 
already been before the jury twice. Fur-
thermore, the prosecutor reminded the jury 
that the evidence of the prior convictions 
could only be used for credibility purposes. 
Finally, the possible prejudice caused by 
the prosecutor's comments was mitigated 
by the court's instruction: 
You are instructed that the fact that a 
witness had been convicted of a felony 
and/or convicted of any crime involving 
dishonesty or false statements is to be 
used by you only in weighing his credibil-
ity, and it is to be so used only if you find 
and believe that such a fact indicates a 
person is more likely to tell a falsehood. 
""[IJf there had been any implication ad-
verse to the defendant, the trial judge gave 
an appropriate cautionary instruction which 
it should be assumed that conscientious 
jurors would follow." State v. Trusty, 28 
Utah 2d 317, 502 P.2d 113, 115 (1972). 
Therefore, we find that any prejudicial er-
ror that occurred during the closing re-
marks was harmless. 
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
[5, €] In a jury trial in a criminal pro-
ceeding, we review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the jury verdict. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443, 444 (Utah 1983). "We reverse a jury 
conviction for insufficient evidence only 
when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficient-
ly inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have enter-
tained a reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant committed the crime of which he wis 
convicted.'1 Id. See also State v. Lamm, 
606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980); State t. 
Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 882-83 (Utah 1978) 
Defendant contends that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove intent and to support 
the jury verdict but he provides no analy-
sis, no citation to the record, and no sup-
porting case law. We have consistently 
held that if counsel on appeal does not 
provide citations to the record, we need not 
reach the merits of his or her substantive 
claims. See, e.g., Arnica Mut Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah CtApp. 
1989). 
We affirm the trial court and hold that 
defendant's prior convictions were properly 
admitted and that the prosecutor's closing 
remarks did not rise to the level of preju-
dice warranting a new trial. 
GARFF and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
G. ADAMS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a 
Utah limited partnership, and CA. Fer-
rin, Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v, 
David L. DURBANO, Paul Sachter, Rich-
ard Mortensen, Steven R. Cundick, and 
Mariene H. Cundick, Defendants and 
Appellants. 
No. 880393-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 8, 1989. 
Action was brought to collect amount 
due on note secured by junior trust deed 
G. ADAMS LTD. PARTNERSHIP v. DURBANO Utah 963 
CUe a« 782 Fid 962 (Utah App 1989) 
following nonjudicial trustee sale pursuant 
to senior trust deed, which left note unse-
cured. The Second District Court, Weber 
County, Ronald 0. Hyde, J., entered sum-
mary judgment in favor of holders of note, 
and appeal was taken. The Court of Ap-
peals, Orme, J., held that (1) statutory 
three-month period for commencing action 
to recover balance due did not apply to 
obligation secured by junior trust deed fol-
lowing trustee sale pursuant to senior trust 
deed, and (2) untimely affidavit in opposi-
tion to summary judgment was properly 
stricken. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
1. Mortgages <s=*375 
Statutory three-month period for 
bringing action to recover balance due fol-
lowing sale of property under trust deed 
did not apply to obligation secured by jun-
ior trust deed following trustee sale pursu-
ant to senior trust deed. U.C.A.1953, 57-
1-32. 
2. Judgment <s=»185.1(l, 8) 
Affidavit submitted in opposition to 
summary judgment, some weeks after 
hearing on motion, was properly disregard-
ed and stricken, especially in view of repre-
sentations by counsel of nonmoving party 
that extra time was needed to obtain cer-
tain documentation and counsel's submit-
ting affidavit ^instead jof ^documentation. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56. 
Douglas M. Durbano (Argued), John H, 
Geilmann, Durbano, Smith & Reeve, Og-
den, for defendants and appellants. 
William Schwartz (Argued), Shawn C. 
Ferrin, Hansen & Anderson, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiffs and respondents. 
Before GARFF, GREENWOOD and 
ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
Appellants are makers on (they say guar-
antors of) a note held by plaintiffs and 
initially secured by a trust deed. That 
trust deed was junior to a trust deed which 
was foreclosed nonjudicially. No proceeds 
from that sale were available to apply to-
ward the obligation evidenced by the note 
at issue in this action. In due course, 
plaintiffs commenced this action to collect 
the full amount due on their now-unsecured 
note. They were awarded summary judg-
ment, from which this appeal is taken. 
Appellants raise two basic issues. First, 
they claim plaintiffs' action is statutorily 
barred because it was not commenced with-
in three months of the trustee sale conduct-
ed pursuant to the senior trust deed. Sec-
ond, they claim disputes of fact exist, con-
cerning their status and the nature of then-
obligation, which make summary judgment 
inappropriate. We do not agree and, ac-
cordingly, affirm. 
[1 ] The statute on which appellants rely 
provides, in part, as follows: 
At any time within three months after 
any sale of property under a trust deed, 
as hereinabove provided, an action may 
be commenced to recover the balance due 
upon the obligation for which the trust 
deed was given as security, and in such 
action the complaint shall set forth the 
entire amount of the indebtedness which 
was secured by suck trust deed, the 
amount for which such property was 
sold, and the fair market value thereof at 
4he-date ^of-sale. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1986) (emphasis 
fcdded). Appellants' argument that the 
statute somehow applies to bar this action 
is untenable for at least four reasons, 
first, the plain language of the statute, in 
particular the emphasized adjectives, clear-
ly indicates the statute limits only the 
rights of the beneficiary under the trust 
deed that was foreclosed—it does not af-
fect the rights and obligations of parties to 
Other trust deeds. Very simply, if the ben-
eficiary of a trust deed elects to foreclose 
nonjudicially, is owed a deficiency follow-
ing application of the sale proceeds, and 
wishes to obtain a deficiency judgment, an 
action for that purpose must be commenced 
by the beneficiary under that trust deed 
within three months of sale or any claim to 
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a deficiency is waived. The statute does 
not purport to address the status of obli-
gations secured by junior trust deeds fol-
lowing a trustee sale pursuant to a senior 
trust deed. 
1. Appellants observe thai many trust deeds, in-
cluding the one involved in this case, provide 
that any default in obligations secured by a 
senior lien will be deemed a default of the 
excess of the obligation secured bv the 
trust deed which was foreclosed. 
Finally, policy considerations are at odds 
with appellants' position. Nonjudicial fore-
closure of a trust deed spares the benefi-
ciary the cost of a lawsuit and the delay 
and uncertainty of a six-month redemption 
period. It is appropriate, however, to im-
pose a price on these benefits. The price is 
chiefly in the form of restrictions on the 
availability of a deficiency judgment The 
action must be brought almost immediately 
and the deficiency amount will be calculat-
ed with reference to the fair market value 
of the property rather than the amount bid. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32(1986). It is 
fair to extract this price from the benefi-
ciary who made the decision to take the 
nonjudicial shortcut It would be grossly 
unfair to saddle a beneficiary under a jun-
ior trust deed with one aspect of that bur-
den even though he or she did not partic-
ipate in the decision and received no corre-
sponding benefit 
In sum, the trial court ruled correctly in 
denying appellants' motion to dismiss. 
[2] The remaining question is whether 
the court properly granted summary judg-
ment to plaintiffs. We have carefully re-
viewed the entire record. Plaintiffs* mo-
tion was supported with several detailed 
affidavits setting forth Jacts Jwhich, if tin-
controverted, would clearly entitle plain-
tiffs to judgment Appellants responded 
with brief affidavits setting forth two con-
elusory statements and certain irrelevant 
observations as to the value of the proper-
ty. In essence, the facts detailed in plain-
tiffs' affidavits remained uncontroverted 
for purposes of Utah R.Civ.P. 66, and judg-
ment for plaintiffs, on the record before 
the court, was appropriate. See, e.g., 
Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 
1985) ("An affidavit which merely reflects 
the affiant's unsubstantiated conclusions 
and which fails to state evidentiary facts is 
insufficient to create an issue of fact"). 
obligations secured by such trust deeds. This" 
true. However, many do not. One examplcis 
the standard short-form trust deed widely used 
in this state. 
Second, the interpretation urged by ap-
pellants would work anomalous results in 
several situations. For example, if a senior 
trust deed was foreclosed nonjudicially, the 
beneficiary of a junior trust deed would 
have only three months to bring an action 
on the note formerly secured by his or her 
trust deed. But what if that note was not 
in default? In appellants* view, the benefi-
ciary would still have only three months to 
bring an action even though no action could 
be brought if no default existed. If the 
debtor could stay current for those three 
months, he or she could then cease making 
any payments whatsoever with absolute 
impunity.1 
Third, the cases relied on by appellants 
are wholly inapplicable. One admittedly 
involves the beneficiary under a junior 
trust deed, but it was that beneficiary who 
foreclosed nonjudicially and then sought to 
bring first an action for deficiency judg-
ment—and then such an action thinly dis-
guised as one for breach of contract—be-
yond three months from the date of sale. 
Cox v. Green, 696 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1985) 
(per curiam). Another case actually con-
cerns the effect of a typographical error in 
a notice of -sale. ^Concepts, Inc. v. First 
Sec. Realty Servs., Inc., 743 P.2d 1158 
(Utah 1987) (per curiam). The opinion 
merely observes in passing that § 57-1-32 
"requires an action to recover the balance 
due upon the obligation for which the 
trust deed was given as security to be 
commenced within three months after the 
sale of the property under trust deed," id. 
at 1159 n. 1 (emphasis added), in no way 
even implying the strained interpretation 
appellants urge. The third case, Randall 
v. Valley Title, 681 P.2d 219 (Utah 1984), 
concerns multiple trust deeds, but deals 
only with the disposition of sale proceeds in 
JOHNSON v. DEPT. OF EMPLOYMENT SEC Utah 965 
a t e MM 782 F.2d 96$ (UuhApp. 1989) 
Appellants submitted an extensive affi-
davit some weeks after the hearing which 
would make the question a closer one, espe-
cially concerning the amount of the judg-
ment The trial court disregarded the affi-
davit in entering judgment and later for-
mally entered its ruling striking the affida-
vit The court explained its decision in 
these terms: 
This matter was heard on a motion for 
summary judgment Counsel for the de-
fendants stated that he would be able to 
substantiate his defense if he was al-
lowed some time to obtain the paper 
work from Commercial Security Bank. 
This additional time was granted over 
plaintiffs' objection. When the addition-
al time allocation had run out, defen-
dants' counsel contacted this judge by 
telephone stating he needed additional 
time because of the switchover from 
Commercial] Security Bank to Key 
Bank, they were having difficulty locat-
ing the documents in question. This ad-
ditional time was informally granted. 
Later, rather than supply the Court with 
the purported documentation, defendants 
submit an affidavit, which sets up a new 
argument based on opinion and conclu-
sions in regard to the transaction. The 
documentation that defendants' counsel 
stated he would submit to the Court has 
never been submitted; and no authority 
was^granted J or Jthe submission -of addi-
tional affidavits and/or argument 
We see no abuse of discretion in the court's 
treatment of the untimely affidavit, espe-
cially in view of this explanation. 
The judgment is affirmed. The case is 
remanded for a determination of the attor-
ney fees to which plaintiffs are entitled in 
view of their success on appeal. See 
Management Servs. Corp. v. Development 
Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 408-09 (Utah 1980); 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-52 (1986). 
GARFF and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
(O f «T«UM*itSYSUM> 
Kevin R JOHNSON, Petitioner, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY and Morton Thiokol, 
Inc., Respondents. 
No. 880703-CA, 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 8, 1989. 
Claimant sought review of denial of 
unemployment benefits by Board of Re-
view of the Industrial Commission. The 
Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held that: (1) 
positive drug test which revealed marijua-
na metabolites in employee's blood consti-
tuted just cause for dismissal which pre 
eluded employee from receiving unemploy-
ment compensation benefits, and (2) Court 
would not consider issue raised for first 
time on appeal of whether Utah Drug and 
Alcohol Testing Act violated constitutional 
guarantees of equal protection, and wheth-
er Act was unconstitutionally implied to 
employee. 
Affirmed. 
1. Administrative Law and Procedure 
$=>796 
Social Security and Public Welfare 
«=»652 
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